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RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENTS
A WRITTEN obligation negotiable in form is usually transferred by means
of an indorsement on the back of the instrument and a delivery to the trans-
feree. Although the indorsement is merely a written instruction signed by
the transferor-or his signature alone-, its use in the transfer transaction
gives the transferee both the primary right to collect the amount of the prom-
ise made in the instrument from the principal obligor and the secondary con-
ditional right to collect from the transferor if the obligor does not pay at
maturity. The conditions precedent to this secondary right to collect from
the indorser are due presentment and due notice of non-payment.
The transferee by indorsement, if' he takes for value, before maturity and
without notice, also has the right to collect the instrument from the maker,
acceptor or prior indorsers free from any defenses inherent in underlying
transactions which would be good against his transferor.
If these consequences were held to follow every negotiation, regardless of
the wording of the indorsement, restrictive indorsements would present no
problem. But the legal effect of the so-called "restrictive indorsement" has
never been completely settled; and although it is not a new method of trans-
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ferring an instrument,' two conflicting theories as to its legal consequences are
still current. One is that a restrictive indorsement is not an indorsement at all.
Under it, therefore, the transferor does not automatically incur the secondary
liability to pay the transferee if the principal obligor does not, and because
the transferee does not become a holder through negotiation, he does not take
free of defenses good against his transferor. According to the other theory,
which was first advanced by Ames, a restrictive indorsement is an indorse-
ment. The transferor using this form of indorsement is therefore held to
assume the ordinary indorser's liabilities, and his indorsee may be a holder
in due course.
Section 36 of the Negotiable Instruments Law classifies three types of writ-
ings as restrictive indorsements: the first prohibits further negotiation of
the instrument, e.g., "Pay X only"; the second constitutes the indorsee the
agent of the indorser, e.g., "Pay X for collection"; and the third vests title
in the indorsee in trust for some other person, e.g., "Pay X in trust for Y."
The first type may be summarily treated both because it is of minor import-
ance and because there is virtually no case law concerning it.2 Its sole re-
strictive effect is to deny the transferee's right to negotiate the instrument.
The transferee acquires all the other privileges of an indorsee, including a
claim to the money due thereon, the right to sue the maker and all indorsers,
and the opportunity to establish his position as a holder in due course. Even
transferability is not destroyed completely since the indorsee can still assign
his claim, but if he does assign it, his transferee cannot be a holder in due
course. The real controversy over the nature of a restrictive indorsement
centers around the second and third types. It is the conflicting theories as
to the legal consequences to be attached to these types which will here be
examined in detail.
THE FIRST THEORY: A RESTRICTIvE INDORSEMENT
Is NOT AN INDORSEMENT AT ALL
In determining the rights of the transferee under this theory, the under-
lying transaction is all important. How the words of the "indorsement" will
be interpreted depends on whether the transfer was by way of gift, sale, or
for collection, since the deliveree will have different rights according to whether
he is a donee, buyer, or agent for collection of the instrument. In commercial
transfers the basic question is whether or not the transfer was effected to
1. In the middle of the eighteenth century Lord Hardwicke spoke of bills being
frequently indorsed in this manner. See Snee v. Prescott, 1 Atk. 245, 249, 26 Eng. Rep.
157 (Ch. 1743). And Lord Mansfield recognized the restrictive indorsement in Ancher
v. Bank of England, 2 Dougl. 637, 99 Eng. Rep. 404 (K. B. 1781). In 1829 the wurds
"Pay X ... or ... order for mv use" were held so dcearly restrictive that "whoever reads
the indorsement must perceive that its operation is limited." See Lkyd v. Sigourney, 5
Bing. 525, 3 Younge & Jervis 220, 148 Eng Rep. 1160 (Ex. Ch. 1829).
2. The only American case found was Power v. Finnie, 4 Call 411 (Va. 1797).
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shift the risk of financing or to hire some functionary to collect, and the an-
swer to'this question depends in large measure on whether the writing on
the back of the instrument gives notice of the claims of third persons. If it
does, the regular consequences of an indorsement normally will not ensue
because knowledge of such claims increases risk and transferees are generally
unwilling to assume these risks. If no words of restriction are present, how-
ever, regular consequences do occur.
Support for this view may be found in the Negotiable Instruments Law,
for the Act declares that a writing on the back of a negotiable instrument will
not be called restrictive for lack of words of negotiability. Hence an indorse-
ment "Pay X" is by implication "Pay X or order," and the negotiability of
the instrument is not restrained.4 Nor does it matter that the indorser in his
own mind intended that his "Pay X" should be restrictive, for such a special
indorsement is held to be non-restrictive.5 The writing is an indorsement
because no claims of third persons are indicated. Moreover, both the second
and third types of writing classified as restrictive by section 36 do give notice
of such claims."
Section 37 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is also in accord with this
position. Under this section if the transfer is effected by a restrictive indorse-
ment, the so-called indorsee does not acquire all the rights which he would
receive by a regular blank indorsement. He gets only certain specified rights:
(1) to receive payment of the instrument, (2) to bring any action thereon
that the indorser could bring, and (3) to transfer his rights as indorsee when
the form of the indorsement authorizes him to do so. This last clause is de-
signed to exclude the first type of restrictive indorsement.
Section 47 of the Negotiable Instruments Law further substantiates this
view, for it states that an instrument negotiable in origin continues to be nego-
tiable until it has been restrictively indorsed. Certainly on the face of the
statute the inference to be drawn would seem to be that the quality of nego-
tiability is lost when an instrument is restrictively indorsed. Although nego-
tiability is not a single property but a legal concept embracing the character-
istics of allowing a better title than the indorser's to vest in the indorsee, of
permitting the holder to recover without proving that he gave consideration,
and of letting the indorsee recover the face value of the instrument in his
own name, the primary significance of the term would seem to rest in the
3. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 36. See Fawsett v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 97 I1.
11 (1880).
4. Ibid.
5. See Edie & Laird v. East India Co., 1 Win. BI. 295 (K. B. 1761): "When a man
says, 'Pay to A,' the law says, it is 'to A or order.' He then says, 'I intend it should be
so.' What signifies you intend? The law intends otherwise."
6. "Pay X for collection" imports an agency, and "Pay X in trust for Y" clearly
gives notice of the claim of the cestui.
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first of these characteristics. 7 If this characteristic is included in the meaning
of the word "negotiable" in section 47, a restrictive indorsement clearly is
not a true indorsement, for the plain mandate of the section when thus inter-
preted is that a restrictive indorsee cannot get a better title than his indorser
had.
An institutional analysis also leads to the conclusion that a restrictive
indorsement is not an indorsement. The bare essentials of such an analv-
sis may be briefly indicated. In the standard transaction for the future e:-
change of goods for money or for the borrowing of monev, the buyer or
borrower at the time he enters into the transaction gives to the seller or lender
a writing in the form of a negotiable promissory note or an acceptance upon
a negotiable bill of exchange (other than a check). One of two events then
regularly follows: the seller or lender delivers the note or acceptance to a
commercial bank and receives from the bank the present value of the sum
of money which the promissory note or acceptance expresses a promise to
pay in the future; or the seller or lender delivers the note or acceptance to a
commercial bank with instructions-either express or implied-to present it
for him and to pay over the amount received if any. In both cases the seller
or lender assumes the burden of financing the exchange; but in the first tran-
saction-commonly termed a discount-he later shifts the burden to a func-
tionary or business unit which specializes in financing, while in the second,
he continues to carry the burden of the financing but utilizes an agency which
specializes in the process of liquidating such obligations. Commercial banks
serve as these functionaries, and they traditionally will assume in respect to
such transctions only purely financial risks.8 Moreover, they do not regularly
collect for their customers claims other than those unconditionally and abso-
lutely payable. Thus it appears that unless the initial transaction of sale or
borrowing includes the giving of a note or an acceptance and unless the note
or acceptance is absolute and unconditional, the seller or lender will generally
be unable to utilize a commercial bank either to shift the burden of financing
or to collect the amount due from the buyer or the borrower.
If the seller or the lender does shift the burden of financing to a commercial
bank and delivers the note or acceptance to the bank, the commercial bank
may shift the burden to another bank which may in turn use other banks in
the process of collection. For the same reason that the note or acceptance
given by the buyer or the lender in the original transaction must, if it is to
serve its purpose, express only an absolute and unconditional promise, the
regularly employed written evidence of the transfer from the seller or lender
7. See AmERICAN IN7SIUTE OF BAN-KING. NEGOTIABLE INs5TRI7WMENTz-s (1941) S. For
an elaborate attempt to prove that this thesis is not correct, see (1929) 7 Tex. L. REV.
520.
S. For example, risks as to the credit of the parties, risks as to the fluctuation of
the interest rate, etc.
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to the bank-the indorsement-must not express or give notice of the rights
or claims of any person except the transferee or indorsee. If it gives notice
of such other rights or claims, the instrument is not available to the bank as a
means of shifting its burden to another bank since the other bank normally
will not assume the risk of determining the existence, the extent, and the va-
lidity of these claims. Hence any writing upon the back of a bill or note which
expresses more than the fact of transfer to the deliveree is not a true indorse-
ment.
If, on the other hand, the seller or lender, or the bank which has assumed
the burden of financing the original transaction, wishes simply to employ a
bank to effect collection or liquidation, there is no objection to having the
instructions written on the back of the instrument express or give notice of
the transferor's or some third person's rights or claims to the proceeds. It
is, in fact, perfectly regular to transfer a bill or note in such a way as to indi-
cate the rights or claims of the transferor and perhaps even of third persons.
In our commercial culture, however, such a transfer necessarily terminates the
possibility of the instrument's being further used for the purpose of shifting
the burden of financing. And if indorsement means part of the transaction
of negotiation, that is, of the transaction which shifts the burden of financing,
such a transfer is not an indorsement.
THE SECOND THEORY: A RESTRICTIVE INDORSEMENT Is AN
INDORSEMENT WITH NOTICE OF COLLATERAL EQUITIES
Under this theory a restrictive indorsement is a special indorsement which
gives subsequent parties notice of collateral equities of the indorser or of third
persons designated in the indorsement. By a restrictive indorsement the
indorser enters into the same contract as any other indorser with the result
that the indorsee may recover from the restrictive indorser, the drawer, and
the maker or acceptor. While the beneficial ownership remains in the indorser,
the legal title passes to the indorsee.
The primary objection to this view is the fact that section 47 of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law says that a restrictive indorsement terminates the
negotiability of the instrument. In order to make this section consistent with
the theory, it is necessary to take the position that "negotiable" is used here
in a limited sense only and does not include the usual meaning of shutting
off equities in favor of the negotiatee. The section, it is argued, applies only
to the first type of restrictive indorsement specified in section 36; and this
position is supported by the use of disjunctive language in section 36 which
states that an indorsement is restrictive which either (1) prohibits further
negotiation; or (2) constitutes the indorsee agent of the indorser; or (3)
vests the title in the indorsee in trust for some other person.
Further arguments based on the Negotiable Instruments Law have been
advanced by proponents of this second view. Thus Dean Beutell argues that
[Vol. 52: 890
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since'section 47 does not by its ternis provide that an instrument becomes non-
negotiable after a restrictive indorsement, this negative inference need not
be drawn. He suggests that the section merely says that an instrument shall
be negotiable until restrictively indorsed, which may indicate that it was aimed
at conditional indorsements or conditional and qualified acceptances.0 And
he contends further that since the Negotiable Instruments Law defines in-
dorsement as an indorsement completed with delivery,10 the first restrictive
indorsee may be a holder in due course if the language of the indorsement
permits, even though subsequent indorsees may not be; for negotiability is
not lost until after delivery to the first restrictive indorsee.'1 Another possible
argument is that since the legal effect of a restrictive indorsement on unma-
tured paper is described in sections 36(1) and 37 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, section 47 may be considered as applying only to overdue paper.
While section 47 does not distinguish between matured and unmatured paper,
it may be contended by interpreting the meaning of "negotiable" as some-
thing less than shutting off the equities, that this section was intended to pre-
serve the characteristic of negotiability between the maturity date and the
time of restrictive indorsement.12
Dean Bigelow makes the cogent argument that since paper payable on its
face to X in trust for Y is negotiable, there seems to be no reason to apply a
different rule to paper indorsed to X in the same manner.13 Consequently, if
the restrictive indorsement is of the second type, the instrument should remain
as freely negotiable as before though it carries notice of the agent's limited
powers. And being subject to the rules which apply to the disposition of trust
property where a person acquiring it has notice of the trust, it should also
remain negotiable if the restrictive indorsement is of the third type. These
propositions mean only that the purchaser must ascertain whether the trustee
has authority to dispose of the property at the risk of being subjected to a
constructive trust by the cestui if the trustee had no authority. Finally, it
is argued that since by the unwritten law merchant indorsement to a trustee
does not affect negotiability except with respect to the cestui and since this
rule is generally accepted by the courts as proper, section 47 should not be
interpreted as varying it by a doubtful implication.1
4
COMPARISON OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES UNDER THE Two THEORIES
Indorsee v. maker or acceptor. Under the theory that a restrictive indorse-
ment is not an indorsement at all, the transferee may not recover from the
9. See BEUTEL, BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmEwNS LAw (6th ed. 1933) 487.
10. N OTA LE INSTR U MENTS LAW § 191.
11. See BEuTEL, loc. cit. .rpra note 9.
12. See Smith, The Concept of Negotiability as Used in Section 47 of the N. I. L.
(1929) 7 TF-x. L. REV. 520.
13. See BIGEuow, BILLS, NOTES AND CHECKS (Lile's 3d ed. 1928) §271a.
14. Ibid.
19431 895
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
obligor if the obligor has defenses good against the transferor. By the op-
posite theory, if the transferee has no notice of the defenses and takes before
maturity, he may recover. -
The leading case in this category dealing with the third type of restrictive
indorsement is Gulbranson-Dickinson Company v. Hopkins.1 Here the
payee, X, wrote on the back of the defendant-maker's negotiable promissory
note, "Pay to the order of A Bank for credit account of Y." At the time Y
gave it to the bank, neither Y nor the bank knew that the consideration for
the note had failed. When the notes were dishonored at maturity, A Bank
transferred them to Y. The court ruled that Y could not recover, holding
that since section 37(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides that a re-
strictive indorsee can bring any action which the indorser could bring, it clear-
ly implies that a restrictive indorsee cannot bring actions which the restrictive
indorser could not bring. Because the A Bank could not have sued the maker
successfully, and because Y as assignee obtained only the title of the A Bank,
Y also could not sue.
1
This case clearly adopts the theory that a restrictive indorsement is not
an indorsement. Here the transfer was held to be only an assignment, and
consequently the plaintiff had the lesser rights of an assignee rather than
the rights of a holder in due course. The court had no difficulty in finding the
"indorsement" restrictive and relied on section 47 of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law to support the notion that the defense of the maker against the
payee was not cut off by the transfer to the bank for the plaintiff's benefit.
A literal reading of sections 37 and 47 certainly leads to the result which
the court reached, but the decision-though never overruled-has been sharply
criticized by the proponents of the other theory.'7 According to their argu-
ment, since accepting a negotiable instrument as collateral security for a pre-
existing debt constitutes value 18 and since the trustee gets legal title when
the cestui gives value, the A Bank was a holder in due course under the tin-
written law merchant. Thus the plaintiff-transferee, who stands in the shoes
of the transferor, should likewise have had that status. Although this result
seems more just than the actual decision, some interpretation of the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law is necessary to reach it. Section 47 is a forbidding
obstacle unless Dean Beutel's argument that the first restrictive indorsee (A
Bank) may be a holder in due course because under section 191 indorsement
means indorsement plus delivery is accepted. The difficulty with this argu-
ment is that it is based on a distinction between the first restrictive indorsee
and subsequent indorsees, and this differentiation seems unwarranted both
from the standpoint of commercial practice and under the Negotiable Instru-
15. 170 Wis. 326, 175 N. W. 93 (1919).
16. See the last sentence of section 37 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
17. See BEUTEL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 486-88. See also Smith, oc. cit. sispra note
12.
18. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 25.
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ments Law. Sections 36, 37, and 47, taken together, indicate that all restric-
tive indorsees are on the same plane,' and no distinction has been made be-
twreen them either prior to or after the general adoption of the Act. Nor does
section 191 necessitate this result, for delivery to the first indorsee completes
the indorsement contemplated in section 47. Negotiability, therefore, is imme-
diately destroyed by operation of that section, and all holders, including the
first restrictive deliveree, take subject to defenses. -O Since section 37 seems
to deal generally with the rights of restrictive indorsees without making any
distinction between the various types of restrictive indorsements, and its sec-
ond subdivision apparently makes the rights of a restrictive indorsee coter-
minous with the indorser's rights, it is difficult to see how the indorsee can
be endowed with any better standing. Those commentators taking the other
view argue that no negative inference should be drawn from sectiun 371 2),
which provides that an indorsee under a restrictive indorsement shall have the
right to bring any action that the indorser could bring, but that this section
should be regarded as permissive only, creating rights, but not delimiting
them. Such an interpretation, however, makes this clause mere surplusage
since an assignee always has the right to bring an action against his assignor;
there would seem to be little point in incorporating this clause if its sole pur-
pose were to bestow this conceded right. Furthermore. unless the Act con-
templated that restrictive indorsees were not to be holders in due course, the
last clause of section 37, which provides that subsequent indorsees are to-
acquire only the title of the first indorsee under the restrictive indorsement,
is rendered meaningless. -The only reasonable assumption would seem to be
that the first indorsee gets only the rights of his indorser. Only in the light'of
this assumption does this last provision become significant, for the assumption
eliminates the otherwise possible interpretation that the subsequent indorsee
might be a holder in due course although the first indorsee took subject to the
defenses of prior parties.
There is one argument, however, which limits the force of the Gidbranson
case as support for the "not-an-indorsement" theory. Since the note in the
case was not delivered to the plaintiff until past due, he could not be a holder
in due course in any event. The court expressly refused to consider the
effect of the restrictive indorsement if there had been a union of legal and
equitable titles in the plaintiff-cestui before maturity. Thus the court seemed
to intimate that if the A Bank had indorsed to plaintiff prior to maturity, the
plaintiff might have been a holder in due course.2' Inasmuch as the plaintiff
unquestionably had the right in the first instance to have the note indorsed
by the payee directly to itself, instead of in trust for itself, the injustice of
the decision is apparent. And it illustrates the ineauity which may result from
19. See (1935) 39 Dic. L. REv. 121, 122.
20. Ibid.
21. Compare Fawsett v. National Life Ins. Co., 97 Il1. 11 (1,0).
1943]
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relying solely on the form of an indorsement to decide a case, however tech-
nically sound the argument may be.
The case of Werner Piano Company v. Hendcrson & Rccsc 2 also follows
the theory that a restrictive indorsement is not an indorsement. In this case
the W Company bought notes for value before maturity, allegedly without
notice of the defense of failure of consideration which the maker had against
the payee. The writings, on the back of the instruments, "Pay to the order of
the X Bank for credit of account of W Company," were held to be restrictive
indorsements, and consequently the W Company was not, as a matter of law,
an innocent purchaser for value. Being conclusively presumed to have had
notice of the maker's defense against its transferor, it could not recover. Here
again, if the payees had indorsed simply "Pay W Company" or had used a
blank indorsement, plaintiff W Company would have been a holder in due
course, providing the jury had found that it actually had no notice of the de-
fense at the time of the purchase of the note 2 3 and as such holder it would
have won.24 There is no valid policy for ruling that the language of the in-
dorsement in and of itself gave the W Company notice, but the result shows
the great divergence between the consequences of a true indorsement and the
consequences which courts are apt to attach to a restrictive one.
Even where an indorsement is factually in blank, courts have interpreted
it to be restrictive when it appears from extrinsic evidence that the indorsee
of the payee was in fact a trustee, and have denied recovery to the payee's
indorsee in his action against the maker even though he had no actual notice.2 5
Such interpretations should not be relied upon as sound precedent, but they
indicate how important a court's determination that a particular writing is
a restrictive indorsement may be to an indorsee.26
When the second type of restrictive indorsement-constituting the indorsee
the agent of the indorser-is used, either agency or trust language may be
employed to describe the transfer. The language adopted by courts following
the theory that a restrictive indorsement is not an indorsement, is in most
cases that of agency, for factually the bargain made by the depositor and
the collecting bank is one of agency. When an intermediate bank receives
the instrument, it is simply a sub-agent. Its powers are limited to those of
its transferor, which usually means that it has a closely circumscribed author-
22. 121 Ark. 165, 180 S. W. 495 (1915).
23. Actually the jury found against plaintiff's allegation that it had purchased the
note without knowledge of the defense. Ibid.
24. See N, OnUE IzrsTRumENTS LAW § 57.
25. See Honan v. National Thrift Corp., 14 Cal. App. (2d) 458,57 P. (2d) 967 (1936);
Union Trust Co. v. Matthews, 258 Mich. 433, 242 N. W. 781 (1932); Comment (1932)
31 MicH. L. REv. 72; (1937) 25 CALF. L. REv. 238.
26. Other cases in which it was vitally important to the decision whether the court
called the indorsement restrictive or non-restrictive: Smith v. Fulton, 51 Ohio App. 12,
199 N. E. 218 (1935); Union National Bank v. Mayfield, 71 Okla. 22, 174 Pac. 1034
(1918).
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ity to collect the proceeds and to remit to its indorser, who, in turn, will remit
to the depositor. The courts adopting this agency theory say that title remains
in the payee-restrictive indorser'2 7 and regard a restrictive indorsement not
as a true contract of indorsement but as the mere creation of a power.2-
Under the opposite view, trust language is regarded as preferable. Al-
though the beneficial ownership remains in the indorser, legal title passes to
the collecting bank. If the depositary bank delivers to another bank for collec-
tion under a restrictive indorsement, this second bank also gets the legal title
which it holds in trust for the depositary bank, and the depositary bank in
turn keeps the equitable claim so created in trust for the depositor.2 0 With col-
lection of the money, a debtor-creditor relationship arises between the two
banks which disappears only after there is a settlement between the banks.
The trust then vanishes, and the depositary bank is a debtor of the restrictive
indorser.30 Courts which say that the restrictive indorsee has title 31 do so
because otherwise he could not sue in his own name or indorse the instru-
ment to another bank for collection. Although the rationalization under the
Negotiable Instruments Law is rarely spelled out in full, it would appear to
be as follows: section 36 designates the restrictive indorsee as an "indorsee";
section 191 declares that an indorsee in possession of a bill or note is a "hold-
er"; and under section 51 the holder of a negotiable instrument may sue
thereon in his own name. Most courts simply quote section 37(2) and con-
dude that" the restrictive indorsee has legal title.
Both of these rationalizations would appear to be simply verbal distinctions
which may be manipulated at the pleasure of the court. In the last analysis,
"title" is where the court says it is, and either agency or trust language may
be used in order to reach the result the court desires. Illustrative of this point
are contradictory decisions in the same jurisdictions holding, on the one hand,
that the restrictive indorsee may sue in his own name because he has "title"
and, on the other, that the restrictive indorser may sue in his own name be-
cause the indorsement is a mere creation of a power with legal "title" re-
maining in the indorser .3 2 Since legal "title" may vest again in a prior in-
27. See White v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658 (1880); Atkins v. Cobb, 56 Ga. E,
(1876) ; Smith v. Bayer, 46 Ore. 143, 79 Pac. 497 (1905); Vermont Evaporator Co. v.
Taft, 107 Vt. 400, 181 Atl. 100 (1935) ; Curl v. Ingram, 121 V. Va. 763, 6 S. E. (2d)
483 (1940).
28. Ibid.
29. See (1908) 22 HARv. L. REv. 150.
30. Ibid.
31. See Wilson v. Tolson, 79 Ga. 137, 3 S. E. 900 (1887) ; Haskell v. Avery, 181
Mass. 106, 63 N. E. 15 (1902) ; Moore v. Hall, 48 Mich. 143, 11 N. AV. 844 (18l2).
32. Compare Mechanics & Metals National Bank of New York v. Termini, 117
TMisc. 309, 191 N. Y. Supp. 334 (Sup. Ct. 1921), with National Butchers' & Drovers'
Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384, 22 N. E. 1031 (189); compare also Moore v. Hall,
48 Mich. 143, 11 N. NV. 844 (1882), with Locke v. Leonard Silk Co., 37 Mich. 479
(1877).
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dorser,33 he may sue without erasing or striking out the "indorsenient" ;34
and probably mere possession by the indorser would be held to raise a pre-
sumption that he had revoked the agent's authority to collect.
35
Whatever the doctrinal rationalization, it has been consistently held with
regard to the second type of restrictive indorsement that either payee-in-
dorser" or indorsee 7 may sue, though defenses of the maker good against
the payee will be sustained in either case.38 Either party may revoke such an
"indorsement." When the transferee returns the paper uncollected, the return
operates as a revocation."0 Or the transferor may revoke the transferee's au-
thority before collection and reclaim the paper.40 After regaining possession
of the restrictively indorsed instrument, the indorser may transfer it for
value to another person, and this transfer nullifies the effect of the former
restrictive indorsement. 41 But the death of the payee-indorser, contrary to
general agency notions, does not revoke the restrictive indorsce's authority
to collect-at least not until the rightful owner intervenes.
42
Because the writing used to effect the transfer shows an agency relation.
ship, the transferee under the second type of restrictive indorsement gets
only limited rights. While he does get the right to receive payment of the
instrument,43 he may not pledge 44 or sell 45 it for his own benefit, and a pur-
chaser from him will not prevail against the maker.40 But if he sells it for the
payee's benefit, promptly remitting the proceeds to the payee, and the maker
thereafter recognizes the purchaser as the owner of the note, the purchaser
will be able to recover from the maker notwithstanding the form of the in-
33. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 121.
34. See Atkins v. Cobb, 56 Ga. 86 (1876). Cf. Carter v. Butter, 264 Mo. 306, 174
S. W. 399 (1915); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933) § 118.
35. See Vermont Evaporator Co. v. Taft, 107 Vt. 400, 181 Ati. 100 (1935).
36. Ibid.
37. See Mechanics & Metals National Bank of New York v. Termini, 117 Misc. 309,
191 N. Y. Supp. 334 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
38. See Smith v. Bayer, 46 Ore. 143, 79 Pac. 497 (1905); King v. Wise, 282 S. W.
570 (Tex. App. Comm. 1926), rev'g Wise v. Boyd, 267 S. W. 543 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
39. See Vermont Evaporator Co. v. Taft, 107 Vt. 400, 403, 181 Atd. 100, 101 (1935);
accord, State v. Hanson, 55 N. D. 370, 213 N. W. 353 (1927).
40. See Bank of America v. Waydell, 103 App. Div. 25, 92 N. Y. Supp. 666 (1st Dep't
1905), aff'd, 187 N. Y. 115, 79 N. E. 857 (1907) ; Vermont Evaporator Co. v. Taft, 107
Vt. 400, 181 AUt. 100 (1935).
41. See Atkins v. Cobb, 56 Ga. 86 (1876).
42. See Moore v. Hall, 48 Mich. 143, 11 N. W. 844 (1882).
43. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 37(1).
44. See Treuttel v. Banandon, 8 Taunt. 100, 4 E. C. L. 99, 129 Eng. Rep. 320
(C. P. 1817).
45. See Claflin v. Wilson, 51 Iowa 15, .50 N. W. 578 (1879) ; Boyer v. Richardson,
52 Neb. 156, 71 N. W. 981 (1897) ; Drew v. Jacock's Adm'r, 6 N. C. 138 (1812).
46. See Mizell v. Hicks, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 158 (Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Finney v. Stanfield
Fraternal Ass'n, 131 Ore. 393, 283 Pac. 415 (1929).
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dorsement.4 " Even though the notes are transferred after maturity, the maker
or his representatives should not be able to defeat a suit by a purchaser from
the restrictive indorsee because of the form of the indorsement if it appears
that the maker received full consideration and made no complaint about the
transfer.48 The writing used to transfer the property in the instrument is
important from the standpoint of evidence in that if a stranger, as opposed
to a party, pays money for a negotiable instrument and "takes it up," the
presumption is that he has bought it and not that he has paid it.49, Although
one authority has held that a restrictive indorsee is not privileged to intro-
duce parol evidence to show that he is iii fact part owner,50 a conflicting au-
thority has allowed him to show by extrinsic evidence that he was in fact a
purchaser and not an agent for collection.5 1
Indorsee v. drawer. The results and doctrines are so similar to the preced-
ing category that this situation scarcely merits extqnded comment. One gen-
eral observation, however, may be made, namely, that in this situation the
courts have generally scrutinized not merely the form of the indorsement but
also the underlying factual circumstances-both as between depositor and
depositary bank52 and as between a sub-collecting bank and the depositary
bank 5 3 -in order to discover the true status of a transferee who holds under
a restrictive indorsement. Since this scrutiny would he unnecessary if the
consequences of a special indorsement attached to a restrictive indorsement,
it lends support to the theory that a restrictive indorsement is not an indorse-
ment.
Indorsee v. indorser. 'When the third type of restrictive indorsement de-
scribed in section 36 of the Negotiable Instruments Law is used, the trans-
feree, in some situations, at least, may not recover from his transferor under
the theory that a restrictive indorsement is not an indorsement. Under the
second theory, however, the restrictive indorsee may recover.
Shortly after the codification of the law of bills and notes in the Negotiable
Instruments Law, Dean Ames pointed out that inasmuch as section 37(2)
47. See State cx reL Gentry v. Hostetter, 343 Mo. 1090, 125 S. IV. (2d) 72 (1939).
48. See Lee v. Mitcham, 98 F. (2d) 298, 69 App. D. C. 17, 117 A. L R. 14-7
(1938). But cf. United States National Bank v. Geer, 53 Neb. 67, 73 N. NV. 2,G (1S93).
49. Lee v. Mitcham, 98 F. (2d) 298, 69 App. D. C. 17, 117 A. L. R. 14-7, 1434 (1938) ;
Cantrell v. Davidson, 180 Mo. App. 410, 168 S. W. 271 (Kansas City Ct. App. 1914).
50. See Smith v. Bayer, 46 Ore. 143, 79 Pac. 497 (1905).
51. See Cairo National Bank v. Blanton Co., 287 S. NV. 8,39 (St. Louis Ct. App.
1926).
52. See Boston-Continental Bank v. Hub Fruit Co., 285 Mass. 187, 189 N. E. 89
(1934).
53. See National City Bank of St. Louis v. Mfacon Creamery Co., 329 Mo. 639, 46
S. NV. (2d) 127 (1932) ; Citizens' Trust Co. v. Ward, 195 Mo. App. 223, 190 S. W. 364
(Springfield Ct. App. 1916); Greenwood Bank v. Johnson, 149 S. C. 277, 147 S. E. 352
(1929).
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gave a restrictive indorsee the right to bring any action that his indorser
could bring, the natural inference-since the indorser could not sue him-
self-was that the indorsee could not sue his indorser. Obviously this refusal
to permit the indorsee to sue his indorser is a reasonable restriction when the
second type of restrictive indorsement is involved and the action is between
the immediate parties; for if the indorsee were permitted to recover from
his indorser in such a case, the money collected would immediately be im-
pressed with a trust for the indorser and he could promptly recover it back.
According to the Ames view, however, it is unjust when the third type of
restrictive indorsement is involved and the indorsee gave value to the indorser,
as, for example, where A sells X's note to B-the trustee of C-indorsing
it, "Pay B in trust for C," and X does not pay it at maturity. By the Ames
view B should be able to recover from A, and section 37(2) should not pre-
clude such recovery. 4 One of the strongest arguments for this view is the
fact that, prior to general legislative acceptance of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, the rule was broadly stated that a restrictive indorsement did not destroy
negotiability. The leading decision on the point, Hook v. Pratt,5 merely held,
however, that when the note was drawn to the maker's own order and the
indorsement read, "Pay plaintiff in trust for the benefit of her son Charlie,"
a motion for nonsuit on the ground that the form of indorsement imported
a gift was properly denied. The most that this case can be interpreted to hold
is that a consideration will be presumed under the third type of restrictive
indorsement and that the plaintiff-indorsee had legal title. No decision was
rendered that the indorsee was a holder in due course since that status was
not necessary to her recovery, but dicta in the decision seems to indicate
that an indorsee of this type should be so considered. These dicta, at least,
are all strongly in favor of the theory that a restrictive indorsement is an
indorsement plus notice that a third person has a claim to the instrument
or proceeds. Although the case supports this theory, it is not cogent author-
ity today because the subsequent general adoption of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law has through section 37(2) changed the result. Under the theory
that a restrictive indorsement is not an indorsement, the plaintiff-indorsee in
the Hook case could not have recovered because she had only the standing
of a donee. The underlying transaction, according to this view, controls;
and since there was no consideration in fact, judgment should have been for
the defendant.
Proponents of the opposite view argue that not only should section 38(2)
be construed as permissive rather than restrictive-so that the indorsee is
not limited to those actions which his indorser could bring and consequently
under the third type of restrictive indorsement may sue his indorser-but
54. See Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law-A Word More (1901) 14 -IAitv.
L. REv. 442, 446.
55. 78 N. Y. 371 (1879).
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also that the extra words of such an indorsement should be taken merely as
a recital of the transaction which gave rise to the instrument. If that is all
such an indorsement amounts to, in the light of the consequences of similar
words appearing on the face of the instrument, negotiability should certainly
not be destroyed. 56
With respect to the second type of restrictive indorsement, fewer problems
arise now than formerly. At one time checks were customarily indorsed for
collection or for account, but after decisions that a drawee bank could not
recover money paid on a forged check from a collecting bank,T banks in large
cities quicldy realized the danger involved in the inability of a restrictive in-
dorsee-drawee to recover from its transferor. Clearing houses, therefore, ruled
that their members were not to send restrictively indorsed paper through
the exchanges unless prior indorsements were guaranteed by the presenting
bank.58 Because of this regulation, most indorsements today are in blanl!. 9
The purpose of a guaranty of prior indorsements is, of course, to make it
unnecessary for an indorsee to ascertain the genuineness of prior signatures-
a task which dearly would be impractical in the case of a distant forwarding
bank.60 When such a guaranty exists, the indorsee may recover from its in-
dorser;61 when there is no guaranty, however, there can be no recovery
because a restrictive "indorser" does not assume the usual indorser's lialil-
ity.62
It is usually held that a subsequent transferee from a restrictive indorsee
cannot recover against the "indorser." A typical illustration of the applic-
tion of this rule is First National Bank of Sioux City, Io-a v. John Morrdll
& Company.63 In this case the payee-restrictive indorser of certain checks
had the drawers stop payment when the bank in which lie had placed the
checks "for deposit only" failed. This bank, in the meantime, had indorsed
56. Compare NEGOTIABLE INsTRumExIrs LAw § 3(2).
57. See Northwestern National Bank of Chicago v. Bank of Commerce of Kansas
City, 107 Mo. 402, 17 S. NV. 982 (1891); National Park Bank of New York v. Seaboard
Bank, 114 N. Y. 28, 20 N. E. 632 (1889).
58. See Andrews, The Clcaring House in Fact and Law (unpublished thesis in Yale
Law School Library, 1941). Andrews has collected the clearing house regulations or con-
stitutional provisions, and all of them require the guaranty.
59. For an actual situation and a delineation of this historical background, see First
National Bank of Belmont v. First National Bank of Barnesville, 58 Ohio St. 207, 50
N. E. 723 (1898).
60. For a more detailed analysis of the nature of the guaranty, see 8 Zou.L..Az,
BANKS ANrD BANxIxG '(1936) §§ 5632-36.
61. See Philadelphia National Bank v. Fulton National Bank, 25 F. (2d) 995 (N.
D. Ga. 1928); Interstate Trust Co. v. United States National Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 185 Pac.
260 (1919).
62. See First National Bank of Minneapolis v. City National Bank of Holyo!e,
182 Mass. 130, 65 N. E. 24 (1902).
63. 53 S. D. 496, 221 N. NV. 95 (1928), 60 A. L. R. 83, 866 (1929).
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the checks to the plaintiff bank, and when the drawees refused to pay them,
the .plaintiff sued the payee-restrictive indorser. The court denied recovery,
declaring that because the first indorsement was restrictive the payee-
indorser had not assumed the liability of an indorser. The depositary bank
and all subsequent transferees were considered mere agents or trustees for
the payee-indorser, and by virtue of a restrictive indorsement the payee-in-
dorser was held to have retained the privilege of revoking the agency and col-
lecting through another channel. The relation of debtor and creditor does
not arise until the correspondent bank receives cash or a solvent credit from
the obligor.
0 4
An analysis of this situation shows that the result reached in the case was
clearly correct. Deposits by customers in banks are executory contracts with
bank credit-the creation of the medium of exchange-as their subject mat-
ter. If a bank's obligation to its customer is real, a check is merely evidence
of a transfer of the obligation. The transaction may be described as sid gen-
eris, the bank being neither purchaser nor agent, for a deposit transaction is
an agreement on the part of the depositor to lend in the future and on the
part of the bank to borrow in the future. Since a court will not enforce an
executory agreement to lend money to a bankrupt, a restrictive indorser clear-
ly should be able to recover checks from the receiver of a depositary bank in
which he has a favorable balance. If the balance were unfavorable, the checks
would probably be regarded as collateral for the depositor's promise to pay the
balance of the current account, so that although the amount of the checks
would be applied on the depositor's liability, he could not reclaim them from
the receiver of the depositary bank. And since the relationship between the
depositary bank and the collecting bank is analogous to that between depositor
and depositary bank, the same results should ensue.
If the view that an indorsement "for deposit" is not a true indorsement is
taken, it is clear that a subsequent collecting bank may not allow its immediate
indorser to draw checks against the balance created by an item so "indorsed"
in reliance upon the draft as security. 6 The proceeds will belong to the "in-
dorser." G Hence, although an instrument transferred in this way may be
accepted in payment of the original restrictive indorser's debt 01 (or of the
beneficiary's debt 68 if the third type of restrictive indorsement is used), it
64. Upon receipt of such credit, it becomes immediately available to the depositary
bank, and the agency for collection terminates. The conditional credit to the depositor
then, and not until then, becomes final. See People ex rel. Nelson v. Sheridan Trust &
Savings Bank, 358 Ill. 290, 193 N. E. 186 (1934).
65. See Freeman's National Bank v. National Tube Works, 151 Mass. 413, 24 N. E.
779 (1890). But cf. Midwest National Bank & Trust Co. v. Niles & Watters Savings
Bank, 190 Iowa 752, 180 N. W. 880 (1921).
66. See White v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 658 (1880).
67. See Hoffman v. First National Bank of Jersey City, 46 N. J. L. 604 (1884).
68. See Hook v. Pratt, 78 N. Y. 371 (1879).
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may not be seized r9 or accepted 70 in payment of a debt of the restrictive
indorsee because the writing used to transfer it earmarks the transaction as one
for collection.
Liability of parties subsequent to the restrictive indorser. Whichever of
the two theories is adopted, every subsequent party into whose hands a re-
strictively indorsed instrument comes is considered by reason of the form of
the indorsement to have notice that its transferor is prima facie not the owner;
hence, he takes subject to the interest of restrictive indorser. Sonja v. Hand-
rulis 71 provides a dramatic illustration of the application of this "rule." The
payee of a check, after indorsing it "for deposit," gave it to A who agreed
to keep it for her. A, in breach of his agreement, gave the check to B who
indorsed it in blank and deposited it in her bank. The depositary bank sent
the check to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for collection. After
collecting the check from the drawee bank, the Federal Reserve Bank remitted
the proceeds to the depositary bank, which credited B's account, and B sub-
sequently withdrew the funds. The payee then sued A, B and the Federal
Reserve Bank for conversion and recovered against all three. The court
held that the "for deposit" indorsement prohibited transfer except for col-
lection for deposit in plaintiff's bank, and since it served notice of plaintiff's
continued title in the instrument, the depositary bank and the Federal Re-
serve Bank "knew" of the blank indorser's lack of authority to deposit the
check. The restrictive indorsement followed by the blank indorsemient was
so unusual that it required inquiry by the Federal Reserve Bank, and since
inquiry would have revealed the theft, failure to make it amounted to bad
faith in a legal sense and rendered the Reserve Bank liable.
12
An analogy may be drawn between this situation and the bailment of a tan-
gible chattel. If an agent of the bailee sells the bailed chattel in violation of
the terms of the bailment, he is held liable in conversion. Or the view may
be taken that the third type of restrictive indorsement is involved, with the
payee's bank as the indorsee-trustee; then, since there has been no delivery
to the indorsee and because delivery is necessary to transfer title by indorse-
ment,73 the Reserve Bank gets no title and is liable for conversion. Under
the theory that a restrictive indorsement is not an indorsement, the blank
indorser, the depositary bank and the Federal Reserve Bank are all liable
because they never had title. Even under the opposing theory, the blank in-
69. See Blaine, Gould & Short v. Bourne & Co., 11 R. I. 119 (1875).
70. See Drew v. Jacocks' Adm'r, 6 N. C. 138 (1812). See also Cohn v. Trade
Bank of New York, 146 Misc. 771, 262 N. Y. Supp. 797 (Sup. Ct. 1933), lwdijfd and
aff'd, 240 App. Div. 966, 269 N. Y. Supp. 143 (1st Dep't 1933).
71. 277 N. Y. 223, 14 N. E. (2d) 46 (1938).
72. Significantly enough, the court took notice of the restrictions on the liability
of a collecting bank. New York had enacted the Bank Collection Code. Id. at 234.
73. NEGoTIABLE IsTRuMENTS LAw § 191.
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dorser and the depositary bank would be liable in a suit in equity for mis-
application of trust funds; the Federal Reserve Bank, however, would not
be liable-unless it had actual notice that the depositary bank, whose agent
it was, had no title-because it did not convert the proceeds to its own use.
And thus there appears again the funddmental question of whether the courts
will hold that a restrictive writing used to transfer an instrument creates
notice which will render the transferee liable if the proceeds do not reach
the restrictive indorser.
If courts will so hold, numerous advantages accrue to the restrictive in-
dorser. Not only may he then have the drawer stop payment,74 but, if he
acts promptly,7 5 he may reclaim the item from a sub-agent collecting bank
even though the depositary bank has credited his account and allowed him
to check against the credit so created. 7  Nor may a sub-agent bank escape
liability to him by crediting the bank which forwards the item bearing the
restrictive indorsement,77 for no agreement or method of bookkeeping between
banks can strip the lawful owner of his right to the item or its proceeds. I-Ie
retains legal control of the paper until the money is received by his agent.78
Moreover, the authority of the bank to which the items are sent for collec-
tion terminates upon its insolvency, so that if it collects thereafter, the pro-
ceeds are impressed with a trust for the restrictive indorser.70 Creditors of
the restrictive indorser will be preferred over purchasers from the trans-
feree,80 over creditors of the transferee even after the proceeds have been col-
lected,8 ' and over the transferee. 2 Furthermore, by indorsing "for deposit
only" instead of merely writing his signature, a transferor may prevent the
cashing of the check if it is lost or stolen on the way to the depositary bank.A8
If there is no holding out and clothing with apparent authority by the re-
strictive indorser,8 4 a drawee is not justified in paying a check which has been
74. See First National Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. John Morrell & Co., 53 S. D.
496, 221 N. W. 95 (1928).
75. For a case where the restrictive indorser did not act quickly enough, see People
ex rel. Nelson v. Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, 358 Ill. 290, 193 N. E. 186 (1934).
76. See Kirstein Leather Co. v. Deitrick, 86 F. (2d) 793 (C. C. A. 1st, 1936).
77. See Chicago First National Bank v. Reno County Bank, 3 Fed. 257 (C. C.
Kan. 1880); People's Bank v. Jefferson County Savings Bank, 106 Ala. 524, 17 So.
728 (1894).
78. See Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50 (1893).
79. See Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 AtI. 369 (1914).
80. See Nicholson v. Chapman, 1 La. Ann. 222 (1846).
81. See Union Savings Bank of Washington v. Carnegie Trust Co., 37 App. D. C.
548 (1911).
82. Holmes & Barnes v. Shawnee Milling Co., 4 La. App. 706 (1926),
83. See Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Citizen's National Bank & Trust Co., 111
N. J. L. 199, 168 Atl. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 112 N. J. L. 497, 171 Ati, 796 (1934).
84. For instances showing what facts amount to a holding out, see Glens Falls In-
demnity Co. v. Palmetto Bank, 23 F. Supp. 844 (W. D. S. C. 1938) ; Edgecombe Bonded
Warehouse Co. v. Security National Bank, 216 N. C. 246, 4 S. E. (2d) 863 (1939).
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restrictively indorsed until it ascertains that the presenter has authority to
receive the proceeds.8, And a restrictive "indorser" does not assume the in-
dorser's liability to indemnify subsequent parties.
This advantageous position of the restrictive indorser is in sharp contrast
with the position of the blank indorser. An agent for collection who holds
under a blank indorsement can give his indorsee the status of a holder fur
value if the holder is ignorant of abuse of authority,80 and it is uniformly
held that the title of a purchaser in good faith and for value before maturity
cannot be affected by parol proof that an unrestricted indorsement was made
for purposes of collection only.8 7 In at least one jurisdiction in which the
Bank Collection Code is in effect, a payee-blank indorser who brings a bill
in equity to recover checks from a sub-agent collecting bank after the depos-
itary bank has failed, may be denied the right to recover them even though
he had the drawer stop payment and the depositary bank indorsed restrictive-
ly.88 The blank indorser thus may suffer a severe loss. Although this result
might not be followed,82 the blank indorser runs the risk that it will be, and
the burden of proving an agency relationship between himself and the depos-
itary bank in such a situation will be thrown on him.
CONCLUSION
At the present time the theory that a restrictive indorsement is not an in-
dorsement at all both better explains existing authorities and serves as a more
reliable predictive criterion. The conflicting theory that such an indorsement
is an indorsement which merely gives notice of collateral equities seems to
require too much interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law to be
palatable to most courts. At one time there was some agitation to have the
Act amended so as to bring it into harmony with this theory ;g0 but interest
in the movement appears to have died down, and it now seems unlikely that
any amendment for this purpose ever will occur. In any event, regardless of
85. See Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Citizen's National Bank and Trust Co., 111
N. J. L. 199, 168 AUt. 32 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd. 112 N. J. L. 497, 171 At. 796 (1934).
86. See Eversole v. Maull, 50 Md. 95 (1878).
87. See NFoTmkrELE INsTRumExrs LAw § 16. For e.mmple, see Coors v. German
National Bank, 14 Colo. 202, 23 Pac. 328 (1890). Parol proof varying the contract
apparently made by the indorser by virtue of his indorsement is admissible, however, in
a controversy between the indorser and his immediate indorsee. See ;Mercantile Bank
of Memphis v. Busby, 120 Tenn. 652, 113 S. W. 390 (1908).
88. See Lipshutz v. Philadelphia Savings Fund Society, 107 Pa. Super. 481, 164 At.
74 (1933).
89. Compare forris-Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin, 63 Wash. 74, 114 Pac. 912 (1911).
90. See PROGRAM OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Conzussiozwts o: Umlao.z
STATE LAws (1931) 28, 41; Smith, The Concept of regotiability as Used in Scclion 47
of the N. L L. (1929) 7 TEx. L. Rnv. 520, 534 et seq. See also Beutel, TheN. I. L Should
Not Be Anended (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 368, 385, n. 81.
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the language used or the theory followed by courts to describe the results of
what occurs when an instrument is transferred by restrictive indorsement,
one fact is apparent-the liabilities which it imposes are always smaller than
those imposed by a blank indorsement. And since it is as effective in every
way as a blank indorsement, it is, therefore, an extremely valuable device to a
transferor.
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